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NOTES
WHY PREMERGER REVIEW NEEDED REFORM-AND STILL
DOES
In 1976, Congress devised the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act1 (HSR) to
improve the enforcement of existing U.S. antitrust law.2 One of the
key elements of the scheme was a requirement that transacting
parties notify enforcement agencies before launching certain major
mergers and acquisitions.3 This premerger notification, according
to advocates, would enhance policing of a small number of
transactions, about 150 per year, possessing particular potential to
be problematic.'
During the twenty-five years since HSR's inception, this
originally modest reporting program has grown in a manner
not only dramatic, but unintended.5 By the year 2000, federal
antitrust agencies were examining the majority of U.S. merger and
1. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976) (codified in 15 and 28 U.S.C. (2000)).
2. HSR sought to improve enforcement through three major titles. Title I expands the
investigative tools available to the Department of Justice. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314. Title
II establishes the premerger notification requirement. Id. § 18a. Title III gives state
attorneys generalparens patriae authority to sue for Sherman Act violations. Id. § 15c. The
premerger notification program is the target of the 2000 amendment and the focus of this
Note. Accordingly, references to HSR throughout this Note are to title 11.
3. Parties to major transactions must file information on the current operations of the
entities involved and a description of the proposed transaction prior to consummating the
merger or acquisition in question. The authority to require the information is contained in
15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(1)(e), but the specific filing requirements are contained in implementing
rules issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). For a discussion offiingrequirements,
see generally STEPHEN M. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONs UNDER THE HART-SCOTr-RODINO
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT § 8, and app. B, C (rev. ed. 1993).
4. See infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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acquisition activity' and dedicating an ever-expanding portion of
their resources to the program. As a result, practitioners and
enforcement officials grew concerned that the program was
weakening the effectiveness of the enforcement agencies,8 if not
wreaking substantive change in antitrust law,9 and there were calls
for its revision.' °
On December 21, 2000, President Clinton signed the Fiscal Year
(FY) 2001 Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Bill." At first
glance, this legislation appears to answer the calls for revision of
HSR's premerger notification program. Buried in this 320-page
omnibus bill are four pages 2 of language amending 3 the program.
Most notably, the amendment institutes inflation adjustment in an
attempt to slow or stop the growth of premerger notification
required under the program. 4
Although it is too early to measure the full impact of the recent
amendment, 5 it is not too soon to consider whether this change
truly answers cries for reform, or merely mutes them. This Note
asserts that the 2000 amendment does not adequately revamp the
6. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
7. The FTC, for example, dedicates more than two-thirds of its Bureau of Competition
resources to merger enforcement, "strain[ing] ... FTC resources to the breaking point." The
Antitrust EnforcementAgencies: The Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission
and The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 10 (2000) (statement of Chair. Pitofsky) [hereinafter Antitrust
Hearings].
8. Id. at 18; see generally Symposium: Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger
Enforcement, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 813 (1997) [hereinafter Symposium].
9. Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on
Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust
Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 880-84 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 8.
11. Pub. L. No. 106-553,114 Stat. 2762, 2762A51 (2000). The portionin question amends
Section 7A(a) of the Clayton Act, and is codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a(a) (2002).
12. 114 Stat. at 2762A108 to 2762A111. This Note refers to these four pages as "the
amendment" or "the recent amendment."
13. Changes include restructuring of the reporting thresholds, establishment of a tiered
fee structure, and expansion of the mandatory waiting period prior to consummating certain
transactions. Id.
14. Beginning in FY 2005, reporting thresholds will be annually adjusted based on
percentage change in the Gross National Product. See id. at 2762A109. For a discussion of
inflation adjustment as a solution to the excessive growth ofpremerger notification, see infra
notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
15. The changes to the Act took effect on February 1, 2001. 114 Stat. at 2762A111.
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program because, although the inflation adjustment should greatly
slow the growth of the program, the amendment does not reverse
the substantive change induced by twenty-five years of HSR
growth. Finally, this Note proposes reforms that would help restore
balance to antitrust law: a return to a more limited review system
and a switch to a less surrogate-based jurisdiction test.16
This Note considers premerger notification in five sections. The
first section opens the examination with a brief review of U.S.
antitrust law prior to HSR and premerger notification.17 This
section discusses the statutory nature of U.S. antitrust law as first
established, then it reviews the development of the field and the
delicate balance achieved between agency regulation and
statutory/judicial guidance.
Section two discusses the creation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act as a means of providing understanding of the Act's goals.1
8
The section outlines the perceived problems leading to HSR's
passage and summarizes the premerger notification provisions.
Consideration of the legislative history reveals that Congress
sought to cause only procedural changes, to encompass only the
very largest of mergers, and to minimize the burden placed on
commerce.
The third section addresses the dramatic growth of reporting
under the Act and outlines the causes of this growth. 9 It then
considers the impact of this growth, particularly with regard to the
burdens HSR creates and the substantive changes it has wrought
in antitrust law. Next, the section considers how the problems with
premerger notification are a product of the surrogate, i.e., dollar-
based, definition of the jurisdiction test. This analysis illuminates
the need for change in the jurisdiction test.
With this understanding of the preamendment situation, section
four examines potential solutions to the jurisdiction test problem.20
The search for an alternative begins with discussion of the
16. Rather than directly determining if a merger is among the X biggest in a given year,
a surrogate-based test uses some other measure of a transaction's "bigness."
17. See infra notes 22-75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 76-117 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 118-90 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 191-237 and accompanying text.
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premerger notification programs of other countries. This review
reveals no valuable new model, however, because all functional
systems use a surrogate definition. Consequently, this section then
considers methods of resetting and adjusting the current test.
Finally, this section outlines a new, less surrogate-based test,
determined mote directly by the level of merger activity.
In light of these options for a revised test, section five examines
how the test that was actually implemented by the recent amend-
ment fails to resolve the problems at hand.2 It then considers
whether this was an act of commission or omission by reviewing the
legislative history of the amendment. Finally, section five explains
how a more limited program of review and a new, less surrogate-
based jurisdiction test could help restore balance to antitrust law
by further reducing the burden of HSR notification and returning
responsibility to the courts.
THE DELICATE BALANCE
This section sets the stage for an examination of premerger
notification by briefly reviewing the development of U.S. antitrust
law prior to HSR. It emphasizes the delicate balance achieved
between statutory/judicial guidance and agency regulation.22
Early Restraints on Trade
When the American colonists included the British common law
tradition among the things they chose to haul to the New World,
they implicitly accepted the idea of restraint of trade.2" In the early
days of the Republic, these "unwritten" rules were sufficient for
controlling commerce in the new nation. The Industrial Revolution
21. See infra notes 238-61 and accompanying text.
22. Nominally, U.S. antitrust law consists of a statutory branch, governed by the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a, and
an administrative branch, governed primarily by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-51.
23. Restraint of trade was an established common law theory at the time. For a
discussion of guilds, crown monopolies, and the origin and growth of common law restraints,
see J.D. HEYDON, THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE 1-36(1971); MICHAELJ. TREBILCOCK,
THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3-29 (1986).
[Vol. 43:17031706
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and the Civil War, however, brought fundamental changes in the
nature of economic power and the nation in which it was wielded.2'
Until this point, "combinations among manufacturers were few in
number and narrow in scope. The inadequacy of transportation
facilities, and the comparatively small capital investment per firm,
prevented manufacturers from reaching out to any considerable
extent into the territory of their potential rivals; and there was thus
less occasion for association."2 This age of primacy for family trades
and small businesses was drawing to a close, however, and as the
nation entered the Gilded Age, the era of the Robber Baron reached
full flower.26
Development of The Trusts
The increasing and improving mechanization of Reconstruction
industry allowed producers to turn out far more goods than ever
before, 21 while the improving system of canal and railroad transport
allowed the nationalization of previously isolated markets. The
result was a business environment ripe for the growth of larger,
more efficient companies than ever before. Smaller competitors who
could be driven out or bought out were absorbed rapidly,29 but as
24. BRIAN HOLDEN REID, THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE WARS OF THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION 19-22 (1999); PETER N. STEARNS, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD
HISTORY 48-53 (1993).
25. ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1922).
26. The term "Gilded Age" was coined by Mark Twain to describe the close of the
nineteenth century. See generally BRYANT MOREY FRENCH, MARK TWAIN AND THE GILDED
AGE: THE BOOK THAT NAMED AN ERA (1965). The origin of "Robber Baron" is unclear, but it
refers to the Industrial Statesmen and Kings of Capitalism who amassed unprecedented
power during the period. For more on these individuals, see THE ROBBER BARONS: SAINTS OR
SINNERS? (Thomas B. Brewer ed., 1970).
27. The Tobacco Trust provides a good example. An expert "hand roller" ofthe time could
make around 2000 cigarettes per day, but a rolling machine could turn out 100,000 daily.
JOHN WILBERJENKINS,JAMES B. DUKE: MASTERBUILDER66 (1927). The cost of manufacture
fell from eighty cents to thirty cents per thousand. Id. at 69.
28. STEARNS, supra note 24, at 49.
29. Cleveland, home to Standard Oil, hosted nearly fifty independent refineries prior to
industry consolidation. RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 111
(1998). During one six week period, John D. Rockefeller purchased twenty-two of the
remaining twenty-six local competitors. Id. at 143. Similarly, "[oif twenty-two Pittsburgh
refiners in existence when Rockefeller [entered that market] ... only one was still in
existence independently two years later." Id. at 163.
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the survivors began to achieve the efficiencies" of vertical inte-
gration"1 and interstate operations, they faced state law roadblocks
to their continued consolidation.
Some states threatened taxation onthe entire capital stock of any
corporation doing business within their borders. 2 It was preferable,
therefore, to hold control of other companies rather than to hold
ownership of those companies' assets. Almost all states, however,
did not allow chartered companies to hold the stock of other firms."
The less-expensive option of acquiring a controlling interest would
not suffice; outright purchase of the competitor's business was
required. By making that purchase, though, companies risked
substantial tax liability. 4
The escape from this Catch 22 came in the form of an old common
law device known as a trust. Typically, stockholders of several
companies exchanged their stock and voting power for trust
certificates representing their percentage of the combined busi-
nesses, now labeled a "trust."3 5 Thus, a trust was simply a form of
holding company, "but without the 'formalities' of a name or legal
incorporation, and without the necessity of public disclosure."" By
the end of the century, there would be more than 300 such trusts
formed,37 the largest of them individually controlling more than one
30. Although the question of whether the Gilded Age trusts abused their monopolistic
position maybe debated, the companies that formed those trusts unquestionably drove costs
down. For example, between 1870 and 1890, rail freight rates declined fifty-four percent.
Francis B. Thurber, Influence of The Trust On Prices, in THE TRUST: ITS BOOK 135, 136
(James H. Bridge ed., 1902). The cost of kerosene, the primary product of the oil companies,
declined seventy-two percent between 1871 and 1902. Id. at 137. Sugar refiners reduced the
margin between raw and granulated sugar prices by sixty-three percent in ten years. Id. at
138.
31. Vertical integration refers to integration offirms performing functions at successive
stages of a product's production and distribution. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S.
GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST. AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 628 (2000).
32. D.T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTrrRUST: ECONOMIC THEORY AND LEGAL CASES
75(1972).
33. Id.
34. The acquired business's assets would now be part of the acquiring corporation's
assets, and as such, would be subject to increased state taxation.
35. ARMENTANO, supra note 32, at 75; 1EARLW. KINTNER, FEDERALANTITRUSTLAW 105
(1980).
36. AIMENTANO, supra note 32, at 75.
37. MATmEWJOSEPHSON, THEROBBERBARONS: THE GREATAMERICAN CAPITALISTS 1861-
1901, at 382 (1934).
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billion dollars-in 1900 dollars-worth of capital.3" This concen-
tration of massive economic power without close public supervision
was to be their undoing.
Public Outcry Against The Trusts
The profound economic and social changes in the United States
during this period were quite traumatic, and corporations and
trusts became a lightning rod for discontent. Books, magazines,
newspapers, and political cartoons touted "fraudulent schemes,
graft, and political corruption." 9 From 500-page treatises decrying
the "rapacious monopolists" who were "allowed by Congress to
plunder the nation,"0 to magazines such as North American Review
covering the "growing antimonopoly movement" and "destructive
hostility toward moneyed corporations,' 41 to newspapers, exem-
plified by Henry Lloyd's perfection of muckraking for the Tribune,
trusts were under attack on all fronts, with the "public" demanding
that Congress take action. Even law reviews joined in the hunt,
with the very first Harvard Law Review volume warning that this
"new monster ... may realize the Satanic ambition,-infinite and
irresponsible power free of check or conscience."42 Those who
attacked the trusts were said to be "anti trust," and with Congress
open to the idea of statutory regulation of commerce, 43 they were
about to impel the creation of an entirely new-and eponymous-
field of law.
38. THOIM1AS J. MISA, A NATION OF STEEL: THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 1865-1925,
at 166 (1995). The magnitude of this figure is highlighted by the fact that the budget for the
entire government had reached this mark only a few years earlier. Hon. T.B. Reed, Spending
Public Money, 154 N. AMER. REv. 319, 319 (1892) (defense, by Speaker of the House, of the
51st Congress approving a budget of "a billion of dollars"), available at http'J/cdl.library.
cornell.edu.moa.
39. 1 KINTNER, supra note 35, at 126.
40. EDWARD WINSLOW MARTIN [JAMES DABNEY MCCABE], HISTORY OF THE GRANGE
MOVEMENT; OR, THE FARMER'S WAR AGAINST MONOPOLIES 9, 396 (Reprints of Economic
Classics ed., 1969) (1873).
41. FRANK LUTHER MORT, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MAGAZINES: 1865-1885, at 292-93
(1938) (citation omitted).
42. F.T. Stimson, 'Trusts.', 1 HARV. L. REV. 132, 132 (1887).
43. In 1887, Congress had enacted the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379
(1877) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-1022 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)), the first
comprehensive economic regulatory legislation.
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The Sherman Act: Statutory Regulation
Between January 10, 1888, and President Benjamin Harrison's
signing of the Sherman Antitrust Act" on July 2, 1890, Congress
considered forty-two bills and two resolutions for constitutional
amendment45 to control these "commercial monsters."46 Had
Congress desired to establish administrative regulation of this field,
its recently enacted Interstate Commerce Act provided a ready
model.' A similar, though less-powerful, administrative agency for
antitrust was in fact proposed, 4 as were regulation by tariff,
taxation, voiding of patents, prohibition of purchase of trust-made
goods, forfeiture of corporate stock and rights, voiding of trusts'
contracts, and eliminating courts'jurisdiction over suits by trusts.49
Congress, however, chose to rely on statutory rather than
administrative regulation.50 Explicit provisions of the Sherman
Act-including creation of criminal and civil actions; assignment of
enforcement responsibility, through the courts, to the Attorney
General; and express provision of federal subject matterjurisdiction
44. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)). The
Sherman Act was neither isolated nor original as a statutory response to antitrust
concern-by 1890, fourteen states had already established some type of statutory
antimonopoly provision. HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES A. GULIcK, JR., TRUST AND
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 341-42 (1929).
45. See BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS RELATINGTO TRUSTS, S. Doc. No. 147, at 3-459
(2d. Sess. 1903).
46. 20 CONG. REc. 1457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Jones).
47. The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended in 1889, created the nation's first fully
independent administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, to oversee
interstate transport. JOSHUA BERNHARDT, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: ITS
HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 1-9 (1923); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY. ORIGINATION OFAN AMERICAN TRADITION 154 (1955). The Commission
had the power to "collect data ... , subpoena witnesses, hear complaints and render
decisions." THORELLI, supra, at 154. Regulation by administrative law was thus a known
option.
48. H.R. 4406, 50th Cong. (1888).
49. These and other proposals for dealing with the trust problem, from a "trust tax" of
forty percent to penitentiary sentences at hard labor, may be found in the forty-two bills
mentioned in the text accompanying note 45 supra and the accompanying Congressional
Record. For representative examples of the listed provisions, see S. DOC. No. 147, at 3-9, 36,
63-68, 411-12 (1903).
50. Given the requirement that the Department of Justice sue to enforce the Act, it was
unavoidably administrative, in the sense that there was agency action involved. The
framework established, however, was as close to a "pure" statutory system as possible.
[Vol. 43:17031710
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and nationwide service -- make clear this choice of a statutory
model for antitrust. 2
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts: Balancing
Congress had left to the courts the task of interpreting the vague
text of the Sherman Act,53 and over the next quarter-century, the
courts sought to define antitrust law. Application of the Sherman
Act varied from hollow54 to aggressive,55 but overall, enforcement of
the law was largely ineffectual. The first fourteen years of Sherman
Act jurisprudence saw only twenty-three suits by the Department
of Justice, with losses in nearly half of them.6 Formation of a
dedicated Antitrust Division in 1903"7 contributed to an increase to
nearly 130 suits over the next decade. 8 Despite the period being a
time of the most rapid and significant concentration of business yet
seen, with more than 600 trusts in existence by 1914,", the
government still lost more than forty percent of the cases it
brought.60
51. Sherman Antitrust Act sections 1-3, 7, 4, and 5, respectively. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
52. To the limited extent that statements by individual members of Congress can
represent legislative intent, those of Senator Sherman are also instructive. Sherman
indicated the bill "has for its single object to invoke the aid of the courts" in dealing with
trusts. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
53. Senator Sherman introduced his bill by stating that the courts should define "the
precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations.... All that we, as lawmakers, can
do is to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will apply them so
as to carry out the meaning of the law, as the courts... have done for centuries." Id. at 2460.
54. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding"monopoly in the
manufacture" outside the reach of the Sherman Act when no monopoly in commerce shown).
The court so held despite the Sugar Trust's control of ninety.eight percent of the "entire
quantity of sugar refined in the United States." Id. at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897)
(stating that "the language of the Act included every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" without exception or
limitation) (emphasis added).
56. See HOUSE SELECT COMMITIEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 84TH CONG., CONGRESS ANDTHE
MONOPOLY PROBLEM: FIF=T-SIX YEARS OF ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENT, 1900-1956, at 659
(Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter MONOPOLY PROBLEM].
57. See THORELLI, supra note 47, at 534-37.
58. See MONOPOLY PROBLEM, supra note 56, at 659.
59. 51 CONG. REC. 14218 (1914) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
60. See MONOPOLY PROBLEM, supra note 56, at 659.
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Public sentiment continued to run high against the trusts, and
although the Court struck down the formidable Standard Oil Trust,
the "Rule of Reason" laid out in that case"' helped fuel the
movement to update antitrust law.62 President Wilson was elected
in part on an antitrust platform, 3 and the program he proposed to
ajoint session of Congress 4 was combined with several bills already
under consideration to become the basis of new trust legislation
known as the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.65
The key point to note about this new legislation is that despite
the apparent failure of antitrust law to that point, Congress did not
abandon the Sherman Act. Instead, the new acts merely
supplemented it, approaching the antitrust problem from two
directions-regulatory and statutory. First, the Federal Trade
Commission Act" adopted a more regulatory approach in that it
established "a new commission with power to review all trade
practices and to order a respondent to cease and desist from using
61. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911) (holding that the Sherman
Act prohibited only those restraints of trade which were unreasonable). "Reasonable"
restraint of trade had been discussed in prior cases, but many argued that the opaque
Standard Oil Rule of Reason made consistent results impossible. See Thomas C. Arthur, A
Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 341-46 (2000). Generally, the Rule in this context refers to allowing
courts, in considering horizontal restraint and cartel questions, to weigh competitive factors
in determining whether a trade-restraining action is reasonable and thus whether it
interferes with competition and is an antitrust violation. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 31,
at 192-99.
62. To say that Standard Oil fueled the movement for change is not to endorse a Populist
view that it departed from other formative era antitrust cases. For more on competing views
of this era, see Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV.
1, 1-13 (1999).
63. ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 333-35 (1922).
64. 51 CONG. REC. 1962-64 (1914).
65. 11 EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES, PART II: THE HART-ScOTT-RODINo ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
OF 1976, at 997-1007 (1985). Note that the FTC Act is not technically an antitrust statute,
despite its concern with anticompetitive activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
66. In recommending new legislation the Senate Committee indicated that the Sherman
Act "should stand as the fundamental law upon the subject." SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 1326, at 2 (1913). Further, debate on the bill explicitly indicated it
was "not a substitute for the antitrust law but is in aid of the enforcement of [it]." 51 CONG.
REC. 12734 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newlands). Most importantly, the FTC Act itself
indicated it shall not "be construed to alter, modify, or repeal the said antitrust Acts." FTC
Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 51.
67. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51).
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those particular practices that it determined to be unfair." "
Although contemporaneous understanding of the Commission may
have been that its zone of regulation lay more toward the judicial
than legislative end,69 the Commission had full regulatory power,
which has been made only more clear as time has passed.7" The
FTC Act itself, however, expressly indicated a continuing role for
statutory antitrust.7 To that end, the Clayton Act72 reinforced the
Sherman Act's statutory system of antitrust law. The Clayton Act
approached the problem more specifically than the Sherman Act by
"making particular business practices unlawful."73 Local price
discrimination, exclusive dealing and tying contracts, holding
companies, corporate acquisitions and mergers, and interlocking
directorates were among the practices explicitly covered.74
Together, the two new acts established a mix of statutory
definition, regulation, and prohibition on the one hand, and
administrative law regulation by a governing agency on the other.
This delicate balancing, created by design, remained the central
feature of antitrust law for more than fifty years.7 5
68. 11 KINTNER, supra note 65, at 990.
69. JONES, supra note 63, at 354.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45,46, 57a (outlining Commission authority). In fact, the agency became
so powerful Congress was forced to restrict FTC power due to its "refusal to heed legislative
guidance." William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 869, 871 (1989).
71. FTC Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 51. In fact, FTC power to act beyond the express statutory
bounds of the Sherman and Clayton Acts in antitrust matters has been challenged. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-50 (1972) (noting distinction between
FTC action on antitrust grounds and action on public policy grounds. FTC action on antitrust
grounds is subject to judicial review and must be grounded in either "the letter or spirit" of
the Sherman or Clayton Acts.); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,454-
55 (1986) (endorsing Sperry distinction of FTC action on antitrust grounds from action on
public policy grounds).
72. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44; 29 U.S.C. §
52).
73. ROGERSHERmAN, ANTITRUSTPOLICIESAND ISSUES 39 (1978) ("The Clayton Act could
be seen as an effort to define unreasonable behavior more specifically to make it easier to
prove, thereby harnessing the rule of reason to good effect.").
74. Clayton Act §§ 2, 3, 7, 8.
75. There have been a number of amendments changing certain elements of the
construct, notably revisions to the Clayton Act, but none of them altered the basic structure.
E.g., Wilson Tariff Act (1894) (including importers of goods under antitrust law); Webb-
Pomerene Act (1918) (exempting exporters); McCarron-Ferguson Act (1945) (exempting
insurance industry); Newspaper PreservationAct (1970) (exemptingnewspapers); Robinson-
171320021
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THE CREATION OF HART-SCOTT-RODINO
Background: Origins and Form
The balanced statutory/regulatory approach functioned well for
a number of years. But as the 1970s dawned, there was growing
concern that government policing of mergers was becoming
ineffective.7" At first glance, this seems improbable in light of the
fact that a defendant's win in 1974"7 represented the government's
first outright loss in nearly a quarter-century of merger litigation. 8
Justice Stewart's famous remark that "[t]he sole consistency" in
merger litigation is that "the Government always wins"79 not
only alluded to the government's perfect win record on liability
before the Warren Court,8" but to the general consensus on the
government's policing effectiveness. The government, however,
actually lost more often than not on the issue of remedy. For
example, in one ten-year period, the government obtained no relief
or deficient relief in twenty-nine of thirty-nine cases.8 Further,
even after achieving an order for post-acquisition relief, the average
case took more than five years to reach that relief.8 2 During this
lag time, the firms' assets, operations, and management become
integrated, and so, according to the claims of HSR proponents,
the firms become "in effect, irreversibly 'scrambled' together.
The independent identity of the acquired firm disappears.
'Unscrambling' the merger and restoring the acquired firm to its
Patman Antidiscrimination Act (1936) (changing areas of Clayton Act price discrimination
coverage); Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act (1950) (redefining Clayton Act section 7 mergers
and expanding coverage to sale of assets). For nearly 7000 pages of details on these and
thirteen other amending statutes prior to HSR, see 1-9 EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (1978-1985).
76. AXINN, supra note 3, §§ 1.0411][b] to 1.04[2].
77. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974).
78. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Mergers and the Supreme Court: The Politics of Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 26 MERCER L. REV. 389, 410-11 (1975).
79. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
80. Fox, supra note 78, at 396.
81. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43, 51
(1969).
82. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2641.
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former status as an independent competitor is difficult at best, and
frequently impossible.""3
To combat this problem, the idea of a mandatory premerger
notification program arose.84 As eventually adopted in title II of
Hart-Scott-Rodino (Clayton Act section 7a), premerger notification
requires that certain mergers and acquisitions be reported to the
FTC and Justice Department, and imposes a waiting period while
the agencies review the transaction." With a few specified
exceptions, the original notification requirement applied when 1)
interstate commerce was involved or affected,86 2) one of the parties
was at least a $10 million entity and the other at least a $100
million entity,"7 and 3) at least fifteen percent or $15 million of the
acquired entity would be held.8 Understanding the precise form of
the original test, however, is less important to an analysis of the
recent amendment than is understanding the forces behind that
form. To that end, a review of the Act's legislative history is
essential.89
83. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2640-41.
84. A limited requirement already existed under FTC rules. It, however, covered only a
few transactions and lacked any waiting period provision. See 39 Fed. Reg. 35717-18 (1974).
85. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
86. Id. § 18a(a)(1). This is known as the Commerce Test.
87. Id. § 18a(a)(2). This is known as the Size-of-Person Test. The 2000 amendment
institutes an annual adjustment to the $10 million/$100 million threshold for transactions
from $50-$200 million, and requires report ofall transactions over $200 million. Pub. L. No.
106-553,114 Stat. 2762, 2762A109 (2000). Exact determination ofwhether the Size-of-Person
Test is met is controlled by the premerger notification rules at 16 C.F.R. §§ 801-802 (2001).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(aX3). This is the Size-of-Transaction Test. The 2000 amendment
eliminates the fifteen percent threshold and changes the dollar threshold to $50 million. 114
Stat. at 2762A109.
89. Understanding legislative history and intent with regard to HSR is of value because
of the brevity of the statutory language and the lack of common law precedent. Compare
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (indicating that statutory language is
conclusive only when it is unambiguous and only "in the absence of a 'clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary") (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'nv. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)), with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)
("What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what
motivates scores of others to enact it .... "), and Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,
50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) ("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do
not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have
a design. The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes."). In any case, despite wide
divergence on the purposes of antitrust law, compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX APOLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (indicating the only goal of antitrust law is
to increase economic efficiency), with Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127
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Legislative History"
Any discussion of the legislative history behind the Act should be
prefaced by noting that its passage was marked by "extraordinary
parliamentary procedures" as it emerged from a "legislative
morass."9 The Act, as passed, was based on a compromise bill
constructed without conference, and "because of the number of
separate bills and titles [involved], the legislative history of the Act
is a patchwork of testimony, floor statements, debates, Committee
Reports and 'Additional Statements.'"92 As to the premerger
notification provisions, however, lt] he legislative history of HSR is
quite clear."
93
There are several key points to draw from this legislative history.
First, the premerger title of the Act was meant only to make the
procedural change of requiring notification-it was not meant to
change substantive law. 94 Second, the provision was intended to
encompass only the very largest of mergers." Finally, there was
concern in Congress about not allowing pursuit of merger
enforcement goals to place too much of a burden on commerce.96
"Only Procedural Change"
The legislative history of HSR indicates that the premerger title
of the Act was intended to make only the procedural change of
requiring notification, and was not meant to change substantive
law.97 In fact, when Representative Rodino introduced the final
U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979) (arguing that antitrust laws protect values, including fear of
excessive concentration of economic power, and enhance individual and business freedom),
review of the legislative history at least makes clear the goals ofpremerger notification. See
infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
90. For afar more detailed legislative history ofthe Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, see generally
10-11 KINTNER, supra note 65.
91. Irving Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 679, 681-82 (1977).
92. Id. at 682.
93. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 877.
94. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
97. For example, it was not meant to change the standard for determining legality of the
merger, nor the burden of proof for a preliminary injunction against the merger. See 10
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version of the bill, he explicitly stated that "[tlhe bill in no way
alters the substantive legal standard" for merger review.98 The
point was repeated throughout debate on the Act: "Let me
emphasize that this bill makes no changes in the substantive law
of mergers;"99 "I wish to stress that the legislation makes
procedural, rather than substantive changes in the Nation's
antitrust laws;""'0 "This bill does not change the substance of the
merger law at all ..... ' In fact, intentional substantive changes
contained in earlier drafts of the title were rejected. 2
Capturing the Big 150, Not a Fixed Dollar Value
Despite the fact that Congress defined jurisdiction in dollar
terms, the point of this "size" requirement was to ensure capture of
certain transactions, not to cover transactions solely because they
surpassed that $10 million/$100 million figure. Because this
contention may seem contrary to the plain language of the $100
million limit, consider the following facts:
a) In introducing the bill, Senator Hart described the premerger
notification requirement as governing "[gliant corporations" which
he then described with the $100 million tag,' indicating that the
focus of the requirement was the largest mergers, more so than
those over a certain fixed dollar amount.
b) The $100 million mark was relevant not for its dollar value,
but for capturing a certain number of transactions. The tailoring
committee sought "a careful balancing of the need to detect and
prevent illegal mergers and acquisitions prior to consummation
without unduly burdening business with unnecessary paperwork
or delays. To this end, the Committee adopted a number of
KINTNER, supra note 65, at 7.
98. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2637.
99. 122 CONG. REC. 25052 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
100. Id. (statement of Rep. Hughes).
101. Id. at 25055 (statement of Rep. McClory).
102. Charles W. Smith & Robert A. Lipstein, PremergerNotification: Coverage, Corporate
Planning and Compliance, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1181, 1183 n.12 (1979) (referring to rejection
of the automatic stay provision and the change from a strictto substantial compliance
standard in reporting).
103. 121 CONG. REC. 8143 (1975).
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amendments ... including ... a reduction in the number of
transactions subject to ... the provisions .... lo4 Consider the
following excerpt from the Senate report on the issue, indicating
numbers of transactions as the basis for that careful tailoring and
reduction:
'Approximately the largest 700 U.S. companies meet the $100
million jurisdictional requirement. Although $100 million
companies account for roughly 40 percent of mergers and
acquisitions, [title II's] dual requirement of (i) a $100 million
acquiring company, and (ii) a $10 million acquired company
would have required ... notification, over the past 5 years, in
less than 100 transactions per annum. With this limitation, the
Committee sought to include within the ambit of the premerger
notification provision primarily those mergers or acquisitions
that were most likely to have a substantial effect on competition.
That is not to say that smaller mergers may not run afoul of the
Clayton Act. To include the bulk of the approximately 3,000
mergers that have occurred annually in the course of the past
several years would, however, in the Committee's judgment
impose an undue and unnecessary burden on business.0"
c) One of the final items considered prior to passage of the Senate
version was an amendment that proposed a $250 million limit, as
opposed to a $100 million upper limit.'0° This change was rejected
on the grounds that the $100 million point was relevant not for its
dollar value, but for its covering a certain level of transactions. "It
is estimated that about 100 transactions per year will be reported
under this $100 million test .... Arbitrarily increasing the threshold
to $250 million will eliminate a number of mergers that could be
anticompetitive and which should be reported."
0 7
d) When Representative Rodino reported the bill out of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, he indicated that the premerger
requirement was for "the verylargest corporate mergers-about the
150 largest out of the thousands that take place every year.... If
these premerger reporting requirements were imposed on every
104. S. REP. No. 94-803, pt. 1, at 65 (1976).
105. Id. at 66.
106. See 122 CONG. REC. 17438-39 (1976).
107. Id. at 17438-39 (statement of Sen. Abourezk).
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merger, the resulting added reporting burdens might more than
offset the decrease in burdensome divestiture trials. That is why
[this requirement] applies only to approximately the largest 150
mergers annually.""'8
e) In debate, Representative Rodino reiterated: "[Tihe terms of
the bill are such that it will reach only about the largest 150
mergers a year."1" 9
f) Representative Hughes similarly stated: "As a result of the
limitations set forth in the bill, only the very largest mergers would
be required to give advance notice. Of the several thousand mergers
which have taken place annually over the last several years, only
150 per year would have met ... the threshold requirements."1
g) A discussion regarding the use of dollar values to "define small
business" highlights the bill's use of a dollar amount as a surrogate
for a transaction number, due largely to the difficulty of otherwise
identifying those transactions:
Rep. Ashbrook: "I would like to know where [the bill] specifically
exempts small business."
Rep. Hughes (after discussing the $10 millionl$100 million
provision): "Would not [you] agree that that is a fairly large
corporation?"
Rep. Ashbrook: "I ... do not think that this bill necessarily would
contain definitions of small businesses which would be
uniformly agreed to."
Rep. Hughes: "[W]e would have a very difficult job in trying to
define small business; but I think that the standard that is used
is carefully tailored to apply only to the 150 largest corporate
acquisitions each year....""'
h) Finally, the statement of Representative Rodino during House
reconsideration is particularly illuminating, because one of the
named sponsors of the Act expresses the legislative intent behind
it: "The Senate bill permitted the [agencies] to promulgate rules
108. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 2572, 2643.
Notably, there was no intent that the notification program catch all problematic mergers.
Rodino went on to admit "smaller, illegal mergers may still be consummated."
109. 122 CONG. REC. 25052 (1976).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 25054.
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subjecting 'small' mergers-involving companies [below the $10
million/$100 million threshold]-to the notification and waiting
requirements provided by this bill. The House bill completely
deleted this provision, and so does the compromise bill. ... [T]he
coverage of this bill should be decided by Congress .... "112 In other
words, Congress did not intend that all, or even most, mergers be
subject to premerger notification. Further, the statement indicates
that subjecting the majority of mergers to such review, as has
become the case through the neglected factor of inflation, is a
proper subject for congressional action.
Burdening Commerce
The third point about HSR's legislative history worth considering
is congressional concern that changes wrought by it not burden
commerce. Recall the "careful balancing" to avoid "unduly
burdening business with unnecessary paperwork or delays;""' the
determination that including the "bulk" of annually occurring
mergers would "impose an undue and unnecessary burden on
business;"" 4 the desire that the adopted provisions "neither deter
nor impede consummation of the vast majority of mergers and
acquisitions."" 5 Further evidence of this concern for limiting the
burden that premerger notification causes may be found in the
numerous transactions exempted from the requirements" 6 and in
the provisions for the enforcing agencies to create even further
exemptions if the subject transactions are "not likely to violate the
antitrust laws."1
17
In sum, Congress sought to cause only procedural changes, to
encompass only the very largest of mergers, and to minimize the
burden placed on commerce. What they actually got was something
quite different.
112. 122 CONG. REc. 30877 (1976).'
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. S. REP. No. 94-803, pt. 1, at 66 (1976).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (2000).
117. Id. § 18a(d)(2)(B).
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HSR's "PROCEDURAL" CHANGE SUBSTANTIVELY ALTERS
ANTITRUST" 8
Dramatic Growth of Premerger Review
Constructing a surrogate jurisdiction test, that is, one defined in
fixed dollar terms,"' was a convenient way for Congress to ensure
premerger notification of the largest transactions each year. This
structure, however, meant that, by the turn of the millenium,
agency jurisdiction would explode beyond its intended bounds. 2 '
The first full year of HSR reporting, 1979, saw 859 reportable
transactions.' 2 ' The year 2000 saw 4926 reportable transactions,
22
a fivefold increase from inception, and more importantly, a greater
118. For several earlier views on the impact of HSR premerger notification, see generally
Symposium, supra note 8.
119. The preamendment jurisdiction test ofwhether notification is required included the
$10 millionl$100 million Size-of-Person Test and the $15 million Size-of-Transaction Test.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
120. A Congressional intent to allow these dollar limits to govern the issue until a vaguely
discussed legislative return to the issue might be read into the comments discussed supra
note 112. The material discussedsupra notes 103-12 and accompanyingtext, however, shows
a clear intent to use these limits merely to capture the largest mergers each year. If the
jurisdiction test is capturing far more than those top 100-150 mergers, then the agencies are
exceeding their intended jurisdictional bounds.
121. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, 10-YEAR WORKLOAD STATISTICS REPORT FY
1978-1987 (1987) [hereinafter WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1987], reprinted in Oversight and
Authorization Hearings Into the Policies and Enforcement Record of the Antitrust Division
(DOJ): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 517 (1988). This number exceeds both House and
Senate estimates of annual filings, but is inkeepingwiththe 650-750 annualfilings projected
by the FTC. See Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on S.1284, 94th Cong. 66 (1975)
(testimony of Chair. Engman); supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text. This may indicate
the dollar limit was too low even at the outset. FTC Chairman Engman's testimony indicated
the agency recommended a $250 million threshold to capture the top 150 mergers. Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1975, supra, at 66, 72. Notably, Engman went on to state: "If we had to
conduct full investigation of all mergers exceeding the $100 million [test], the fruits of our
efforts might not be worth the cost." Id. at 71-72. Note that reportable transactions are
distinct from actual filings because "[ulsually, two filings are received, one from the acquiring
person and one from the acquired person." FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, THE TWENTY-SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO (HSR) PREMERGER
NOTIFICATIONPROGRAM 28 app. An.1 (1999) [hereinafter TWENTY-SECOND ANNUALREPORT].
122. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCALYEAR 2000, at App.
A (2001) [hereinafter TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/osl
2001/04/annualreport2000.pdf.
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than 3000 percent increase over Congress's target level of the 150
largest mergers annually.'
Causes of This Growth
There are three primary causes 124 of this growth: real growth in
the annual number of transactions,"2 real growth in the size of
parties to those transactions and in the size of the transactions
themselves,'126 and inflation devaluing the reporting thresholds. 27
Increasing Total Transactions
Even a cursory review of popular media comments reflects a
widespread awareness among the general public of an ongoing
surge in merger activity,I and statistics support this popular
conception. The annual number of U.S. mergers has increased from
123. Compare Congressional intent to capture only "the very largest" transactions, supra
notes 103-12 and accompanying text, with FEDERALTRADE COMM'N, TWENTY-FIRSTANNUAL
REPORTTO CONGRESS PURSUANTTOTBHEHART-SCO'r-RODINOANTITRUSTIMPROVEMENTS ACT
OF 1976 (1998) [hereinafter TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT] ("As indicated in past annual
reports, the HSR program ensures that virtually all significant mergers or acquisitions
occurring in the United States will be reviewed by the antitrust agencies prior to
consummation.") (emphasis added).
124. Increased compliance may have some effect as well. On the other hand, the FTC and
DOJ have taken active steps to reduce reporting through exemptions, reducing the effect of
both inflation and real growth. See, e.g., DavidA. Balto,AntitrustEnforcement in the Clinton
Administration, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 61, 119-20 (1999) (discussing "two major
expansions of HSR exemptions" which resulted in approximately twenty-percent and ten-
percent reductions in filings).
125. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Justin Martin, CEOs In Danger, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Oct. 1, 2000, at 22, 25
("With the U.S. in the midst of a massive merger wave .... "); Peter Skarzynski, When Mega-
Mergers Don't Make Sense, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, June 1, 2000, at 40 ("The wave of merger
mania that's been going strong for several years now...."); David Stires, Riding The Buyout
Wave, FORTUNE, Dec. 18,2000, at 142 ("The pace of mergers and acquisitions has been rising
since 1992 .... "); Sandra Sugawara, Merger Wave Accelerated in '99. Economy, Internet
DrivingAcquisitions, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1999, at El (noting the recent "frenzy of merger
madness, capping a dramatic wave of global corporate consolidation that has been gaining
momentum through much of this decade."); Kirk Victor & Michael Posner, Merger Mania,
32THE NAT'L J, 2280 (2000) ("[A] tidal wave of mega-mergers [has] reshape[d] the country's
corporate landscape....").
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2276 transactions in 1976 to 9566 transactions for 2000,129
Increased numbers of mergers, of course, may be expected to lead
to increased reportable transactions and increased filings.
Increasing Size of the Parties and Transactions
If the size of the parties involved or the size of the transaction
"grew across" the reportable dollar value, then reportable
transactions and associated filings grew as well.3 0 Inflation-
correcting the 1976 test value to current-day dollars yields a Size-
of-Person test of $31.1 million/$311 million.' These numbers
indicate that, on an inflation-corrected basis, as many as two
thousand notifications should have been filed in 2000 32-- a
significant change from the first few years of reporting. It is
impossible to tell from the reporting statistics whether this real
growth in notification is due to the increased total number of
transactions, real growth of the parties, real growth of the
transactions--or a combination thereof. Its significance, however,
lies in the revelation that more than one half of the growth in
notification is due to inflation.'3
129. See Twenty-Five Year Statistical Review, MERGERSTAT REV., Jan. 2001, at 256. The
FTC primarily attributes increasing mergers to the following factors: globalization of
competition, deregulation, industry downsizing and consolidation, technological change, and
financial market conditions. Mergers and Corporate Consolidation in the New Economy:
Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 52-53 (1998) (statement of Chair.
Pitofsky).
130. There is a recognized trend of growth in the size of parties and transactions. During
testimony before Congress, FTC Chairman Pitofsky recently indicated "the dollar value of
commerce affected by these mergers has... increas[ed by] an astounding eleven-fold during
the past decade .... In the past year alone, companies filed notifications for 273 mergers with
a transaction size of one billion dollars or more ... ."Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 10.
131. CPI-U figures show a 68.9% decrease between 1976 and 2002. See U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (Feb. 20, 2002), available at ftp:/ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.
requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.
132. See TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122, exhibit A, table VI, VIII
(indicating a minimum of 3082-at most 3408-acquiring persons had assets of more than
$311 million and at least 2282-possibly up to 2947-acquired entities had assets of more
than $31.1 million). Note that this rough estimate considers only devaluation of the Size-of-
Person Test, based on 2000 values.
133. Total growth was from 861 to 4926 notifications, while real, i.e., inflation-corrected,
growth was from 861 to as many as 2000 notifications. See supra notes 121-22, 132 and
accompanying text. Note that inflation-correcting from the first full year of reporting
requires using a 1979 to 2000 CPI-U correction, but the estimate of reporting using the FTC
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Inflation"3 '
During the twenty-five years since HSR's passage, the value of
the dollar, based on the Consumer Price Index, has decreased by
more than two-thirds.'35 Adjusted for inflation, the 1976 $10
millionl$100 million jurisdiction test is effectively at a $3.11
million$31.1 million level in constant 1976 terms."3 6 This drastic
change in the value of the jurisdiction test amount, coupled with the
other factors discussed previously, has meant that rather than the
largest 150 transactions annually, more than one-half of all
transactions" 7 each year must be reported to and reviewed by the
agencies.13
8
Impact of This Growth
In view of the dramatic growth in premerger notification, the key
question becomes: Is the current state of affairs necessarily a bad
thing? A former head of the FTC's premerger office described the
program as having "dramatically changed" merger enforcement to
the benefit of "both consumers and the business community." 3 9
report does not change. This is because the tables in that report cover ranges oftransactions.
134. Ironically, although inflation has radically affected the test, and will continue to eat
away at the reporting thresholds until FY2005, the penalty for violating the Act, currently
$11,000 per day, has been subject to inflation adjustment for years. See Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 §§ 1-6, Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat. 890-92
(1990), amended by Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,110 Stat.
1321 (1996) (current version at 28 U.S.C.S. § 2461 nt. (2002)).
135. Based on the CPI-U figures discussed supra note 131.
136. The Size-of-Transaction Test has been similarly affected, with the 1976 requirement
to report only those transactions over $15 million now being effectively reduced to a $4.8
million threshold.
137. Filings were required on 4926 of 2000's 9566 total mergers. TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 122, at App. A, Statistical Review, supra note 129, at 256.
138. Another way of considering the increase is to see that the 150 largest mergers in 1979
represented only seven percent of total merger activity (150 of 2128 transactions). See
Statistical Review, supra note 129, at 269. Even if Congress had desired a fixed percentage,
rather than the fixed number of 150 they indicated, only about 670 mergers (seven percent
of 9566) should have been reviewed in 2000. In either case, the scope of review has
dramatically departed from Congressional intent-from 1.6% of all year 2000 mergers under
a fixed 150, or from seven percent under a fixed percentage, to more than fifty percent.
139. WilliamJ. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years ofMerger Enforcement Under the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 826 (1997). Baer headed the FTC's Bureau of
Competition.
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Conversely, a Department of Justice official involved in developing
the premerger notification scheme has indicated "it is not at all
clear" that the "dramatic impact" of HSR is "desirable."140 To
determine whose view on the desirability of imposing premerger
notification on an ever-increasing portion of transactions is correct,
this section briefly reviews the benefits and costs of premerger
notification after twenty-five years.
Benefits of Premerger Review
Finding actual benefits arising out ofHSR premerger notification
is key because, as one FTC premerger authority acknowledged,
"Premerger notifiction [sic] is not an end in itself. Its value lies in
its demonstrated ability to improve our substantive review of
mergers under the Clayton Act."""
In practice, premerger notification has improved the substantive
review of mergers. The benefits ofpremerger notification have come
in the form envisioned by Congress in its enactment: prior notice
of mergers, opportunity to challenge them before consummation,
and reduction of post-acquisition litigation.142 These benefits, the
enforcement agencies claim, translate to consumer savings. 43 The
DOJ estimates their merger enforcement actions during fiscal year
1999 saved consumers from paying four billion dollars in higher
prices. 14' Estimates of FTC actions increased this direct benefit by
an additional $1.2 billion. " Although some portion of these savings
140. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 865-66. As Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
the Antitrust Division, Sims advocated the Administration's position during debate on HSR.
Id. at 865 n.3.
141. James W. Mullenix, The Premerger Notification Program at The Federal Trade
Commission, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 130-31 (1988).
142. See TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 26.
143. There also have been claims of benefits to the business community. See Baer, supra
note 139, at 839-41.
144. ANTITRUST DIv., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY2000 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION 64
(1999), reprinted inAppropriations for 2000: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 106th Cong. 745 (1999). Note that this figure includes savings from all
transactions-reportable, nonreportable and not reported. A rough measure of
apportionment may be taken by looking at Preliminary Inquiries (Prs) opened.
Approximately three-quarters of Antitrust Division Prs resulted from HSR filings. See id.
at 62, reprinted at 743.
145. See Antitrust Hearings, supra note 7, at 13.
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would have been achieved without premerger notification, the
requirement has nonetheless benefitted consumers. 146 Given these
acknowledged benefits, the question becomes: Are these benefits
worth the burdens that the premerger notification program, in its
current form, imposes to achieve them?
Economic Burdens
Affixing an exact price tag on the premerger notification program
is difficult. 47 It is not difficult, however, to recognize the sources of
that cost. The most obvious and direct is the HSR filing fee.
Acquiring persons must pay a substantial filing fee with their
premerger notification.' In FY 1999, these filing fees resulted in
a burden of nearly $230 million on U.S. merger activity.149 Further,
the 2000 amendment establishes a tiered fee system, with rates
from the current $45,000 fee up to $280,000 per filing. 5 '
146. Of course, these "savings" may be viewed as a shifting of expense, as they can be
considered to come at a cost to some of those same consumers in their role as stock and
mutual fund shareholders.
147. For an accounting of the total direct cost of HSR at almost $1.5 billion a year as of
1996, see Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 890-92. They contend that more than $1 billion
of this cost is for "transactions that raise virtually no antitrust problems." Id. at 892; see also
William J. Kolasky, Jr. & James W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at the Federal Trade
Commission: Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 909
(1997) ("The benefits in terms of catching one or two small transactions the agency might
otherwise miss hardlyjustifies imposingwellover $1 billion in unnecessarytransactioncosts
on American businesses seeking to complete perfectly routine transactions, the
overwhelming majority of which do not require any substantive antitrust review
whatsoever."). For an argument that these estimates are based on assumptions "either
internally inconsistent or implausible on their face," see BAER, supra note 139, at 852-53.
148. The fee was $45,000 prior to the 2000 amendment. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). The
history of this provision indicates there was no fee to file prior to 1989.
149. In fact, the entire FY2000 budget for the DOJ Antitrust Division, as well as all of the
appropriation for the Bureau of Competition (FTC), was derived from these filing fees. See
S. REP. No. 106-76, at 140 (1999).
150. Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2672, 2762A109 (2000). This change maybe expected
to raise the burden imposed by filing fees to at least $380 million per year. H.R. Res. 467,
106th Cong. 6-7 (2000) (estimating that amount for a $45,000 to $200,000 scale). Note that
these figures do not include the impact of HSR civil penalties. See, e.g., United States v.
Blackstone Capital Partners H Merchant Banking Fund L.P., No. 99-0795, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5526,1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,484 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,1999) (imposing $2.7 million
penalty); United States v. Automatic Data Processing, No. 96-0606, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21160; 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,361 (D.D.C. Apr. 10,1996) ($2.9 million); United States
v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 1:96CD00196,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21173,1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
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Another obvious burden of premerger notification is the cost of
conducting filing. In addition to the agencies' costs in running the
premerger program, whether funded by filing fees or general fund
taxes, the parties to the transactions bear significant direct costs in
filing. The amount of data required is considerable. As of 1987, the
FTC received about twelve and one-half feet of premerger filings
every weekl'5 -and the number of filings has nearly doubled since
then.'52 Beyond the investigation, computation, and reporting
involved in any potential merger, those subject to filing incur
significant fees from attorneys, accountants, and economists, as
well as the cost of depositions, transcripts, exhibits, and document
preparation. If the agency decides to require filing of further
information," these costs increase drastically-one case reportedly
involved over 8000 boxes of documents.'54 Preparing a Second
Request can often take a large company "several months and cost
more than a million dollars."155
Finally, the premerger notification program imposes a notable
burden as a result of the repercussions of the transaction costs
involved. The cost of fees and filings couple with the chilling effect
of review to create transaction costs that may prevent desirable
mergers-ones that would benefit the consumer-from occurring.5 6
These repercussions appear in at least two cases: First, when
beneficial mergers that push the envelope on permissibility are not
proposed, 157 and second, when beneficial proposed transactions are
abandoned or scuttled in the face of agency concern.
58
HSR affects potential transactions. In drafting HSR, Congress
considered a proposal for an automatic stay provision that would
have imposed an automatic temporary restraining order on mergers
71,301 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1996) ($3.1 million).
151. Mullenix, supra note 141, at 126.
152. The agencies received 2533 HSR filings in 1987, compared with 4926 by 2000. See
Workload Statistics 1987, supra note 121; TWENTY-THIRDANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122,
at App. AL
153. This procedure is known as a Second Request.
154. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 886.
155. Kolasky & Lowe, supra note 147, at 907; see also 146 CONG. REC. 10990 (2000)
(statement ofSen. Hatch) ("Complyingwith such second requests has become extraordinarily
burdensome, often costing companies in excess of $1 million.").
156. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 885-86.
157. See infra note 159-62 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
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for up to thirty days, with provision for an additional thirty days.'59
This provision, under fire from the Administration and business,
61
was eliminated. This deletion was in part because, as the Assistant
Attorney General heading the Antitrust Division acknowledged
during testimony on the bill, an automatic stay provision
"operate [s] as a severe disincentive to mergers generally ... ."161
The agencies, however, have "taken full advantage of provisions
in HSR giving them the ability to ask for information to essentially
create the automatic stay of a transaction that the 94th Congress
explicitly refused to grant-and that the agencies themselves
agreed (in 1976) was a bad idea."62 The result is that this potential
hold on aggressive-but still legal and beneficial-transactions may
create just such a severe disincentive to their proposal.
HSR also affects proposed transactions. Once transactions have
been proposed, and filings made, the chilling effect may become
even more pronounced. The agencies have the power to block
acquisition pending compliance with not only the initial filing
requirements, but the Second Request provisions 6 -power
equivalent to an injunction. This sort of restraint
introduces business uncertainties and risks that may lead to
cancellation for reasons having little to do with the defendant's
evaluation of the probable ultimate result. It appears that no
proposed merger has survived [this type of opposition] for any
substantial period of time. Many mergers are delicate
transactions involving compromises and predictions about the
future. Obviously, changes in the capital market, the economy,
and the industry may make the merger more or less attractive
to the parties. The financing of a merger may be dependent on
159. 122 CONG. REC. 17268 (1976) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
160. 10 KINTNER, supra note 65, at 18-19.
161. S. REP. No. 94-803, pt. 2, at 213 (1976) (emphasis added).
162. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 881. Further, the 2000 amendment expands the
length of the waiting period that follows substantial compliance with second requests to
thirty days for most transactions. Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2672, 2672A110 (2000).
163. The initial filing contains information on the current operations of the entities
involved and a description of the proposed transaction. See supra note 3. Second Requests
are mandatory requests for additional information that are issued by the enforcement
agencies for transactions in which they open an investigation. See Federal Trade
Commission/Department of Justice, Model Request for Additional Information and
Documentary Material, [Mar. 23,1995] 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 142,524, at 42,753-60 (Mar.
28, 1995).
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loans from financial institutions that cannot remain committed
indefinitely without regard to changes in the money market.'6
An agency challenge, or even an expression of concern, might result
in the premature restructuring 65 or abandonment of the proposed
transaction.166 This may be the case because "when the Commission
decides to challenge a merger, in most cases the transaction is
abandoned before suit is filed. When the transaction is not
abandoned, it is usually resolved as a consent order requiring
divestiture." 11 7 Although agency officials tout these changes or
abandonments as a sign of the effectiveness of their enforcement
programs, 168 the same points highlight the potential for over-
enforcement. The question is whether all of the thirty-eight consent
agreements and thirty-eight abandonments 169 during a recent year
involved transactions that would have been harmful or illegal. If the
agencies have anything less than a perfect track record in terms of
predicting competitiveness following these proposed transactions,
164. Note, Preliminary Relief for the Government Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 79
HARV. L. REV. 391, 393 (1965). Although the quote refers to judicially imposed injunctions,
the effects of HSR investigations can be similar. Further, comments with regard to timing
may be even inore pertinent in the twenty-first century as increased speed of communication
and capital flow make deals more vulnerable.
165. This may come in the form of a consent decree, where parties agree to changes
desired by the agencies.
166. This is such a concern that some merger proposals have begun to expressly account
for it. The record-setting Time Warner-America Online merger agreement, for example,
obligates the parties to fight agency action rather than scuttle the deal. A Bet That the FTC
Will Blink, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 2000, at 6. Very few transactions, however, "can afford the
delay inherent in litigating, even through a preliminary injunction, and even fewer parties
have the stomach for the additional legal fees entailed in such litigation." Kolasky & Lowe,
supra note 147, at 910-11.
167. Mullenix, supra note 141, at 125.
168. For example, the director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition: "Once again, the
Bureau had a busy year. We entered into 22 merger consents .... Parties abandoned another
9 transactions after we expressed competition concerns." Richard G. Parker, Report from the
Bureau of Competition, Address at the ABA Antitrust Section 2000 Spring Meeting (April 7,
2000), available at http'/www.ftc.gov/speeches/rgpbc.htm.
169. The 1999 annual HSR report to Congress listed eighteen consents and twelve
abandonments for FTC cases, twenty consents and twenty-six abandonments for DOJ cases.
TWENTY-SECONDANNUALREPORT, supra note 121, at 2-3. Similarly, the 2000 report showed
the FTC with eighteen consents and nine abandonments, while the DOJ saw eighteen
consents and twenty-nine abandonments/restructurings. TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 122, at 2-3.
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then they have in fact harmed consumers by depriving them of the
same benefits of competition those agencies tout.170
The burden imposed on the consumer-and on businesses-
through beneficial transactions never proposed and beneficial
transactions restructured or abandoned is difficult to determine. It
is, however, no less real than the benefit to consumers produced by
the prevention of illegal or competition-reducing transactions.
The Substantive Impact of Growth in This "Procedural"
Program
Potentially more significant than the burdens imposed on
commerce by the program are the changes that HSR has wrought
in the nature of antitrust law. "[Tihe premerger notification
provisions of the HSR Act have been ... the most important factor
in the replacement of merger control through litigation with a
comprehensive scheme of merger regulation." 1 ' The problem with
such change is that it endangers the statutory aspects of antitrust
law-inadvertently upsetting the statutory/regulatory balance 72
that legislators were explicit about preserving when creating
HSR. ' 3 Rather than statutory regulation overseen by the impartial
arbiter of the courts, antitrust law increasingly is controlled
through regulation and increasingly is a regulatory, rather than
balanced field.
"Today the primacy of the antitrust caselaw is in jeopardy." 74 In
large part, this is because "the Supreme Court hasn't heard a
merger case in something like 25 years. And even at the lower court
level, ... few cases actually go to a verdict by a judge and a district
and even fewer go to courts of appeals."'75 In the decade preceding
170. They also have acted contrary to the goals Congress had in establishing the program.
"I cannot emphasize too strongly that it is the sole purpose of this legislation to provide an
opportunity to enforcement agencies to preview mergers and not in anyway alter the normal
flow of capital." 122 CONG. REC. 25053 (1976) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson).
171. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 865.
172. See supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
174. Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMUL. REV. 1677,1698 (1995).
175. New Economy: Hearings, supra note 129, at 66 (statement of Chair. Pitofsky); accord
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1425 (1998).
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HSR, the Supreme Court produced "an average of more than one
merger opinion a year,"176 but has not produced a single substantive
merger opinion since.177 Similarly, federal district court and
administrative litigations have fallen to "less than half the rate of
the pre-HSR period,"17 with the agencies together averaging only
about eight district court merger cases per year-out of as many as
220 HSR investigations a year. 79
Instead of caselaw implementation of the statutory model,
"regulation and administrative law-making have replaced the
courts as the source for creation and enforcement of antitrust
law."' 0 In fact, "[tihe law in the case reports can no longer be
assumed to represent the operational law. Indeed, to a large extent
the caselaw is misleading."'' "Supreme Court opinions ... are
widely viewed as obsolete. Supreme Court precedents formally
governing ... corporate mergers embrace archaic positions which
are widely recognized as no longer valid."'8 2 Agency guidelines "now
enjoy considerably greater stature than the case law ..... ' Legality
is often "determined in accordance with internal guide lines rather
than case law. The agencies then negotiate complex consent decrees
with the private parties in which the courts play only a largely
symbolic role in reviewing these decrees."8 4 In short, when the
majority of transactions are governed by agency rules-both formal
guidelines and informal actions such as "expressions of
176. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 866.
177. In part, this may be due to the 1974 repeal of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29,
which required that appeal of civil antitrust actions brought by the government go directly
to the Supreme Court.
178. Sims & Herman, supra note 9, at 866 n.7.
179. See WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1987, supra note 121; ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 10-YEAR WORKLOAD STATISTICS REPORT FY 1990-1999 (2000) [hereinafter
WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1999]. The impact of over-aggressive merger policing is also reflected
in decreases in other types of litigation. For example, the agencies averaged eight monopoly
cases per year from 1970-1976, but less than one per year since. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES 44 (1990);
WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1987, supra note 121; WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1999, supra.
180. Waller, supra note 175, at 1400.
181. Gifford, supra note 174, at 1679.
182. Id. at 1680.
183. Waller, supra note 175, at 1404.
184. Id. at 1394.
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concern ' 8-- the body of law in question becomes increasingly one
of a regulatory nature.
This Is a Dollar-Based Problem
In creating premerger notification, Congress desired 1) only a
procedural change, 2) to apply a notification requirement to only
about the biggest 150 mergers per year, and 3) to avoid burdening
commerce to the maximum extent possible. 8 ' What they got was a
massive program of agency review that 1) has induced substantive
change in the nature of merger and acquisition law due to its
present size, 2) covers nearly half of all mergers and acquisitions in
the U.S., and 3) imposes significant burdens on commerce."' This
divergence between Congress's intent and the functioning of HSR
by 2000 was due to the dramatic growth of filing, which in turn,
was due to increasing numbers and size of transactions and the
impact of inflation on the jurisdiction test. 8 8 The fixed-dollar-based
jurisdiction test originally established for HSR reporting is innately
flawed due to its failure to account for inflation. Further, because
the level of reporting has had twenty-five years to grow beyond its
intended bounds, a related problem is the current level of reporting.
In other words, instituting an inflation adjustment starting today'89
is not sufficient to correct the problem with the dollar-based test. If
it is retained, it must also be adjusted to account for the change in
value since 1976 and possibly for the initial error in establishing it
"too low.""9 To determine the optimum way to "adjust" the original
test, the next section considers options for change.
185. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 97-117 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 118-70 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 120-38 and accompanying text.
189. Or in FY2005, as does the 2000 amendment. See supra note 14. Of course, that
amendment does change the Size-of-Transaction Test-to $50 million dollars with no
percentage requirements-effective February 1, 2001. Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762,
2762A109 (2000).
190. See supra note 121.
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POTENTIAL CHANGES TO THE ACT
Searching for Another Model
Investigating other premerger notification systems in search of
alternative approaches will aid in measuring the effectiveness of
the 2000 amendment. More than seventy other countries have some
sort of competition law, 9' about forty of which involve some type of
premerger review. 2 A brief consideration of the systems of some
major free-world trading partners follows.
Japan
Postwar antitrust law in Japan was patterned after U.S.
antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the
FTC Act.'93 As such, the fact that Japan was the first nation to
adopt a premerger notification program 94 might seem to make it a
particularly appetizing candidate for emulation. Established in
1949, there has been no altering of the test because it is quite
simple: "Every company in Japan which wishes to become a party
to a merger, regardless of its corporate size, is required to file a
report with [Japan's Fair Trade Commission.]" '95 Of course, from
enactment through March 1982, only one merger was found to
violate the Japanese prohibition on lessening competition.'96
Whatever the goals of the Japanese system, therefore, the search
for a model should move elsewhere.
191. William M. Hannay, Transnational Competition Law Aspects of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 287, 287 (2000).
192. See Eleanor M. Fox, Foreword: Mergers, Market Access and the Millennium, 20 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 203, 204 (2000).
193. HIROSKI IYORI & AaMORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 11 (1983).
194. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 30, at 540 n.31.
195. IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 193, at 14-15, 85.
196. Id. at 85-86.
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European Community
The European Community adopted premerger notification
provisions in 1989.'9' Parties are required to report transactions if
their aggregate worldwide turnover 9 ' exceeds five billion Euro
(U.S. $4.38 billion) and at least two of the parties each have
turnover in excess of 250 million Euro (U.S. $219 million) in a
member state. 9 9 If the transaction is confined largely to one
member state, it is exempted from European Union (EU)
reporting-it will be considered under national laws.200 The EU
program, then, is similar to the U.S. program, in that it uses a
money-based value as a surrogate for merger "bigness." It is
distinct, however, in that the Merger Regulation directs periodic
adjustment of the amount2 ' and the amount is far higher than the
U.S. threshold. In 1999, for example, the EU requirement produced
only 292 notifications.0 2 The EU model serves mainly to suggest
periodic adjustment as an option and to reiterate the previously
discussed need to reduce the scope of U.S. notification.
France, Italy, and Germany
Most EU member states have national notification programs
where not preempted by the EU regulation.0 3 The French program
is voluntary.2 ' The Italian program is compulsory, but is largely a
mirror of the EU program-with U.S. $400 million aggregate and
197. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395), as amended by Council Regulation 1310/97 of 30
June 1997, 1997 O.J. (L 180), available at http://europa.eu.intcomm/competition/mergers/
legislation/regulation.
198. This is essentiallynet sales value. See id. at5 (definingturnoveras"amounts derived
by the undertakings concerned in the preceding financial year from the sale of products and
the provision of services falling within the undertakings' ordinary activities after deduction
of sales rebates and of value added tax and other taxes directly related to turnover").
199. See id. at 1; Hannay, supra note 191, at 289.
200. Hannay, supra note 191, at 290; Kolasky & Lowe, supra note 147, at 909.
201. 1997 O.J. (L 180) at 2. The adjustment is left to the judgment ofthe Council-it is not
expressly tied to inflation. Id.
202. Report from the Commission to the Council on the application of the Merger
Regulation thresholds, COM(2000) 399 final, at 8 (June 28, 2000), available at
http'//europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/comrpt/2000/com2OOO_0399en01.pdf.
203. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
204. Hannay, supra note 191, at 293.
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U.S. $40 million individual thresholds, 25 and thus adds nothing
new to the discussion. Germany also adds nothing new, setting an
aggregate turnover threshold of one billion Deutschmark (DM)
(U.S. $447.5 million) and a DM 50 million (U.S. $22.4 million)
individual threshold, with some exemptions. 6
United Kingdom
The UK has "no system of compulsory notification" under its
antitrust laws,2 0 instead relying on a voluntary filing system in
which mergers may not be attacked if a filing has been made and
no government challenge is raised within twenty to forty-five
days.20 ' This qualified invulnerability may encourage filing on any
case subject to investigation. In the UK, transactions a) over £70
million ($100 million), or b) affecting more than twenty-five percent
of a good or service in a substantial part of the UK, are subject to
investigation.20 9 This is in effect a nonmandatory threshold. Again,
we see a larger-than-U.S. money-based value, but this model adds
the intriguing idea of a market share test. Unfortunately,
determining market share is a well-known problem in antitrust
law,210 and the UK approach suffers from this problem.2 1'
Canada
Canada has a mandatory premerger notification system212 that
is similar to the U.S. system in that it uses a Party-Size Threshold
and a Transaction-Size Threshold. The Party-Size Threshold
requires that parties have Canadian assets or that sales exceed
205. Id. at 294.
206. Id. at 295.
207. BARRY J. RODGER & ANGUS MACCULLOCH, COMPETrrON LAW AND POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNiTY AND UNITED KINGDOM 242 (1999).
208. Id. at 242-43.
209. Id. at 237.
210. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 31, at 20-70.
211. This is particularly true because the market in question may be twenty-five percent
ofa "substantial part" of the UK. In Regina v. Monopolies and Mergers Comnm'n, 1 WLR 23
(H.L. 1992), the House of Lords held that as little as 1.65% of the area and 3.2% of the
population of the UK was a substantial part for this purpose. The market share test is thus
a very easy one for the government to meet.
212. Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-34, Part IX (1993) (Can.).
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Canadian (CA) $400 million (U.S. $251 million).21 The Transaction-
Size Threshold is complex, but basically it varies from CA $35 to CA
$70 million (U.S. $22 to $44 million) with transaction type-asset
acquisition, stock acquisition, amalgamation, or combinations (such
as joint ventures).21' The Canadian system, thus, does not provide
an approach significantly different from the U.S. approach.
Summary
The approach taken by all of these models,215 save the market-
share prong of the UK test, is to define the jurisdiction of the
premerger notification program through some surrogate for
bigness-be it sales, assets or some combination thereof. All such
approaches share the problems of the current U.S. system.216 The
difficulties with the market share test in the UK exemplify concerns
with that approach-problems that recently led Belgium to abandon
market share in favor of an EU-like test.217 In short, analyzing the
premerger programs of other nations reveals no new structure on
which to base a revised HSR jurisdiction test.
Options for "Adjusting" the Original Test
The most obvious response to the devaluation of the jurisdiction
test is to raise the dollar amounts in question. The preliminary
issue with such a proposal is whether this adjusting is done in
a manner consistent with the goals of the Act.218 The question
is whether the amount should be corrected by returning to
Congressional intent and setting a value that correctly reflects the
213. Id. § 109.
214. Id. § 110.
215. The same is true of Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, and Switzerland. Andre Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in
International Merger Control, 20NW.J.INTLL. &BUS. 233,238-39 (2000). Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Taiwan, and Turkey use alternative sales/market share systems as in the UK Id. at
239-40.
216. For more on these problems, see supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
217. Fiebig, supra note 215, at 239.
218. Of course, it is possible to ignore the legislative history, for example, by arbitrarily
setting new amounts. This may have been done in the 2000 amendment, although the
legislative history of the amendment is so slight there is no indication that such ignoringwas
intended. See infra notes 238-57.
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150 largest transactions (or, in light of the increased total number
of transactions, to a number proportional to the increase in
mergers), or by simply inflation-adjusting the original dollar value.
The answer is not simple.
Setting a value to capture only the 150 largest current day
transactions would result in a jurisdiction test of well over one
billion dollars for each party,219 and would capture only the largest
1.6% of all mergers22°--a percentage so small that it might hamper
the effectiveness of the program. Similarly, adjusting the dollar
value to a level corresponding to the level of filing at program
inception221 would also result in a jurisdiction test of more than one
billion dollars for the acquiring and one-half billion dollars for the
acquired persons."22 A similar Size-of-Transaction test would
involve only billion dollar events.2 s
If returning to the idea of an extremely low number-be it the
originally envisioned top 150 or the equivalent of program-
inception-level filing-would endanger the effectiveness of the
program, then perhaps merely adjusting the original values for
inflation is appropriate.
Adjusting the amounts established in 1976 to reflect a similar
value in 2002 dollars would yield a $31.1 million/$311 million Size-
of-Person Test and a $46.7 million Size-of-Transaction Test,224 and
could be expected to immediately reduce filings by about half.225
Such a test not only negates the effects of future inflation, but
corrects for the effects of past inflation. It also reduces the burden
on commerce while still insuring notification of major mergers. The
actual change made by the 2000 amendment is in fact fairly close
to this option-the amendment adjusts the Size-of-Transaction Test
to $50 million and then institutes a prospective annual inflation
adjustment on not only it, but on the original, 1976 dollar value
219. See TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122, exhibit A, tbls. VI, VIH.
220. See supra note 138.
221. The first full year of HSR notification saw filings on 7.0% of all mergers. Id.
222. Capturing approximately the top 7.0% of year 2000 filings would require these
thresholds. See TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122, exhibit A, tbls. VI, VIII.
223. Id. at tbl. I.
224. Based on the CPI-U figures discussed supra note 131.
225. Based on 2000 filing data. See TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122,
exhibit A, tbl. II.
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Size-of-Person Test.22 Although this change is more effective than
some of the reforms considered, it is still not entirely true to the
congressional intent behind that program, in that it is based on a
dollar amount that was too low originally. 27 Even at half their
current level, filings would be far above the originally envisioned
level and there is no apparent target level in mind here.2"
Furthermore, twenty-five years of experience have shown that a
jurisdiction test defined in dollars may not be the optimum way to
capture for review a desired level of merger activity. Adjustment
provisions admittedly help remove inflation as a major factor in
reporting growth-a change recommended by scholars.229 They do
not, however, change the fact that dollar values are an indirect
measure of the "bigness" of a transaction. If the goal of premerger
notification is to ensure agency review of the largest mergers each
year, then some measure of current merger activity should be part
of the jurisdiction test.
Another Approach to the Problem
Obviously, legislation simply directing that the biggest mergers
be reported is not feasible-as shown by the struggle to draft 1976
language."0 Instead, a jurisdiction test should be established that
relies on an annual adjustment of the reporting threshold. The
Commerce Test would remain unchanged. The Size-of-Person Test
could be deleted, as per the recent House plan, or indexed as per the
Senate proposal. The Size-of-Transaction Test, however, would
reflect the level of merger activity and would determine whether
filings were required.
226. See supra note 14.
227. The 859 filings the first full year of HSR effect were more than five times the desired
150. See supra notes 103-12, 121-23 and accompanying text.
228. S. 1854 came closest, as sponsor Sen. Hatch explained the purpose of the change was
to exempt mergers and acquisitions not posing any competitive concerns and reduce
reporting by half. 146 CONG. REC. S10990 (2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Indicating
reporting would be reduced by half, however, is not exactly establishing a target level.
229. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1324 (1999) (recommending indexing
limits to inflation). Note that adjustment provision has precedent in Title 15 sections. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 19(aX5) (2000); ef supra note 134 (discussing adjustment of HSR penalties).
230. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
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The agencies are already required to provide a significant amount
of data on HSR and merger activity via the annual report.23 ' With
this data at hand, agency determination of the appropriate level of
merger "bigness" for required reporting, and thus the setting of an
appropriate Size-of-Transaction, is possible. For example, if
Congress were to determine that the biggest ten percent of all
mergers should be subject to premerger notification require-
ments,2 3 2 and so direct the agency, 2 ' a review of 2000 data would
reveal the proper review level for the current pace of mergers as
957 reviews per year.24 This number could then be used to
determine the Size-of-Transaction Test for the next year-in this
case, somewhere over $150 million.2 5 For FY2001, any transaction
over this threshold would require premerger notification. This
system would be less surrogate-based because, although still
defined in an annually promulgated dollar amount, that amount
would be based more directly on the actual size of a merger relative
to overall merger activity.
Such a revised test, which included an explicit target level of
review-ten percent in the example above-and an annual
promulgation of the threshold supporting that level, would answer
concerns about not only past but also future growth. There are
several advantages236 to such a program:
a) It would negate the impact of inflation. This proposal carries
the benefits of other indexed proposals. The Size-of-Person Test,
which will be indexed, would directly negate the impact of inflation
through the annual adjustment mechanism. Further, the Size-of-
Transaction Test would also achieve the benefits of an indexed
system, albeit indirectly. Because the annually promulgated
231. 15 U.S.C. § 18aQ); see also TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122.
232. Most likely subject to exemptions, as now, and mandatory notification provisions for
high-interest fields.
233. Of the two antitrust enforcement agencies, the FTC is the proper one for this role
because [t]he FTC, unlike the DOJ, is an independent regulatory agency with authority to
conduct formal administrative ... and rulemaking proceedings .... "Kolasky & Lowe, supra
note 144, at 895.
234. Ten percent of 9566 mergers is 957. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
235. TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122, exhibit A, tbl. I.
236. The primary disadvantage would be that the reporting threshold would change
annually-but any plan that includes priodic changes to account for inflation carries this
problem.
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threshold would be determined anew each year, using merger
values at the time of adjustment, inflation would be no more of a
factor than in an indexed system.
b) Congress would control agency action and the burden on
commerce. Congress's intent will be achieved-if they desire a ten
percent review level, then reviews will remain at or near ten
percent rather than fluctuating with variations in merger activity.
Further, it will be an explicitly determined value, rather than the
haphazardly achieved level set by a purely prospective indexing.
c) It would account better for the long term. Unlike a fixed-
number test or even an indexed test, a test determined by current
merger rate is capable of declining. The record merger pace seen
during the 1990s is unlikely to continue forever, and a test built to
capture a certain number-or percentage-of this record pace at
record transaction values will be poised to create further,
unforeseen problems when this merger wave passes. On the other
hand, when a new wave begins-or the current one intensifies-real
growth in transactions, whether due to transaction size or numbers
of transactions, would not endanger effective review of the target
transactions due to overreporting.
d) Finally, this test would account for the substantive changes
wrought by HSR because, by reducing the scope of the program to
something approximating that envisioned at its creation, the power
of the enforcing agencies to impact the course of antitrust law by
regulating and influencing parties prior to their pushing the bounds
of statutory antitrust would be reduced to nearer what Congress
intended."7
THE FAILURE OF THE 2000 CLAYTON ACT AMENDMENT
The recent amendment does contribute to resolving problems
created by HSR growth. Adjusting the jurisdiction test threshold to
$50 million accounts for inflationary growth since the program's
creation, and the inflation-adjustment provision will help control
the problem in the future. These changes help to address concerns
about burdens on commerce created by HSR. Where the
237. Any reduction in scope helps in this manner somewhat, even the 2000 amendment.
But a more significant reduction, such as to the top ten percent, is needed.
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amendment fails, however, is by leaving in place substantive
changes resulting from a test too loose at inception, which did not
account for real growth in merger activity. The result is the decline
in statutory and caselaw governance of the field, and the growth of
a large and expanding body of regulatory law. If, because it fails to
address this issue, the recent amendment endorses this shift to
regulatory law, the question becomes: Was this endorsement
intentional or accidental?
Legislative History of the Recent Amendment
Express congressional support for legislative change of the HSR
jurisdiction test began to appear in early 1999."3' By the end of that
year, bills were introduced in both chambers proposing such
change. 39 The legislative history of both bills is very sparse, as
neither received a committee report. H.R. 4194 never left the
House, and was not discussed or debated outside committee.240
Similarly, the Senate bill, S. 1854, was the subject of no substantive
comment and no debate between its November 4, 1999 introduction
and its October 19, 2000 passage.24 Unfortunately for those who
wish to understand Congress's design in passing the recent
amendment, neither bill went to the White House on its own.
Instead, the amending language became part of the FY2001
Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Bill.4 In analyzing legis-
lative intent behind the amendment then, only Senate discussion
of S. 1854 at introduction and after passage, and discussion of the
appropriation measure proves instructive.
On introducing S. 1854, Senator Hatch expressly acknowledged
the original design of HSR:
238. See 145 CONG. REC. S3527 (1999) (Hatch Amend. No. 207 to S. Con. Res. 20).
239. The House considered the "Small Business Merger Fee Reduction Act of 2000," H.R.
4194, 106th Cong. (2000), and the Senate produced the "Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1999," later known as the "21st Century Acquisition Reform and
Improvement Act of 2000," S. 1854, 106th Cong. (2000).
240. Other than Daily Digest mentions of committee work, its only appearances in the
Congressional Record are a notation of referral to committee and the addition of sponsors.
See 146 CONG. REc. H1851, H2341, H7003 (2000).
241. Cf 146 CONG. REC. S10834-35 (2000) (submitting amended text of bill); S10848-50
(2000) (reprinting bill and recording passage).
242. See supra notes 11-14 ana accompanying text.
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When the statute was first enacted, Congress intended to limit
the scope of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to very large companies
involved in very large transactions. At that time, the House
Judiciary Committee reported that the statute would apply
"only to the largest 150 mergers annually: These are the most
likely to 'substantially lessen competition'-the legal standard
of the Clayton Act."
Hatch continued and indicated that the increase in reporting
threshold was meant to provide "regulatory and financial relief for
companies" and "to ensure that the Antitrust Division [of the
Justice Department] and the FTC efficiently allocate their finite
resources to those transactions that truly deserve antitrust
scrutiny."24' These purposes, however, do not indicate that the
purpose of HSR was changed with the amendment. The only
indication of the desired scope of the program is a comment that the
increased thresholds "effectively exempt [ from the Act's notification
requirement mergers and acquisitions that, based on the FTC's
data, do not pose any competitive concerns."245 Such a nebulous
standard as "not posing competitive concerns," inferred from the
effect of the change rather than a stated goal of it, does not seem
likely as a purposeful change in direction for a program with
legislative intent as clear as that of HSR, particularly when the
speaker had just reiterated that clear intent.
Immediately after Senator Hatch's remarks, cosponsor Senator
Kohl spoke, indicating the bill would "lessen the agencies' burden,"
"enable the agencies to allocate their resources," and "lessen
regulatory burdens and expenses imposed on small businesses."245
The only hint of an intended change in scope was in comments,
similar to Senator Hatch's, about eliminating review of transactions
posing no competitive concerns.
The next record of discussion of the issue did not come until after
S. 1854 had already passed the Senate-comments arguably the
243. 145 CONG. REC. S13974 (1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
244. Id.
245. Id. This comment was made in regard to a $35 million Size-of-Transaction Test,
rather than the enacted $50 million threshold. There is no indication of the standard for that
determination, nor of legislative guidance for it.
246. 145 CONG. REC. S13975 (1999) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
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least indicative of "legislative intent." Co-sponsoring Senators
Leahy and Hatch reiterated the goals professed for the bill on its
introduction, restating what the existing notification program was
improperly including, but not necessarily changing its defined
scope.
247
Senator Hatch pushed for attachment of HSR changes "to one of
the remaining 'must-pass' vehicles,"248 and after S. 1854 passed to
the House, there was almost no discussion of it as a discrete item
of legislation. Instead, the HSR amending language was embedded
in the FY2001 Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Bill.249 This
indeed became a "must-pass" bill, as Congress progressed through
a record twenty-one continuing resolutions to keep the federal
government operatingY °0 Unfortunately, substantive discourse on
the enacted changes to HSR was negligible in connection with a bill
that "was not subject to amendment. The underlying appropriations
bills went straight from the [individual body] Committee to the
conference committee, totally bypassing the [House or] Senate
floor."251
The only comments about the HSR changes were a near verbatim
restatement by Senator Kohl of his comments on the passage of S.
1854,252 and a House Appropriations Subcommittee statement to
accompany the bill." The subcommittee explanatory language
merely indicates that the "bill was developed through negotiations
by subcommittee members"254 and that"[tihe conference agreement
includes a new section 630, which modifies existing law to include
a three-tiered Hart-Scott-Rodino fee structure that increases the
247. 146 CONG. REc. S10920-21 (2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at S10989-90
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
248. 146 CONG. REC. S10990.
249. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
250. 146 CONG. REC. S11855 (2000) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
251. Id. at S11280 (statement of Sen. Byrd). Notably, this sort of use of must-pass
appropriations bills to enact substantive law drew considerable fire. E.g., id. at H12444
(statement of Rep. Obey) ("This bill has been a poster child on how not to run a legislative
body."); /a at S11233 (statement of Sen. McCain) ("Congress should not permit the
appropriations process to circumvent the normal legislative process.").
252. Id. at S11872 (statement of Sen. Kohl).
253. Id. at H12446-82 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
254. Id. at H12446.
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filing threshold for a merger transaction from $15,000,000 to
$50,000,000. Similar language was included in" prior versions.255
In short, neither the express statutory language, nor the recorded
legislative history, indicate that the 2000 amendment was expressly
intended to change the scope of HSR reporting from the largest
mergers annually. Similarly, the other goals of the original HSR
enactment, achieving only procedural change and minimizing the
25625burden on commerce, were not explicitly altered.257
The Impact of the Amendment
Regardless of whether the recent amendment was meant to act
as an explicit endorsement of the growing movement from balanced
to regulatory-based antitrust law, the impact of the amendment
makes it a sub silentio endorsement. Unless there is further change,
the level of agency review will remain higher than envisioned by
Congress and higher, perhaps, than it should be. Unfortunately, the
"change in favor of a regulatory agency-centered approach has
become so entrenched that the changes are probably irreversible."258
The only way the change is likely to be reversed 259 is for Congress
to further amend the Clayton Act to provide for review of a much
smaller percentage of merger activity, in keeping with the original
intent of the premerger notification program. Although this could
be accomplished by an inflation-adjusted, dollar-based test
targeting the largest 150 mergers or a corresponding percentage,260
a more elegant solution, which places Congress more fully in control
of premerger notification and the course of the nation's antitrust
law, is to establish a less surrogate-based, percentage-based
system.26 '
255. Id at H12481.
256. See supra notes 97-102, 113-17 and accompanying text.
257. In fact, minimizing HSR burdens was a theme repeated throughout the sparse
legislative history. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
258. Waller, supra note 175, at 1386.
259. The agencies could themselves reverse it by radically expanding exemptions, to the
point where coverage of the program was reduced to a small percentage of all mergers. Self
interest, however, indicates this is highly unlikely. For more on this Public Choice theory,
see id. at 1426-30.
260. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The runaway growth of HSR's premerger notification program
has significantly altered it from what was envisioned at its creation.
The 2000 amendment addresses some of the issues associated
with this growth. The annual adjustment provision will curb the
problematic growth due to inflation, and the increase in reportable
transaction threshold to $50 million will reduce the level of
reporting significantly. In short, this amendment is better than
continued unchecked growth. The change does not adequately
address the departure of the program from its intended, very
limited scope, however, and it does not have the flexibility that a
less surrogate-based test would have. To more fully resolve
the problems with HSR premerger notification, and perhaps
more importantly, prevent antitrust law from becoming almost
exclusively a regulatory field, the Size-of-Person Test should be
adjusted for inflation since 1976, and the Size-of-Transaction Test
should be set annually, at a level that would capture a specific
rather than somewhat random portion of merger activity. The
portion should be a much smaller segment of all merger activity,
ensuring a future role not only for the agencies, but also for the
courts, in U.S. antitrust law.
Andrew G. Howell
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